Industrial Development in Africa

My first blog in a while following an extended break.

UNIDO has published its Industrial Development Report for 2009, commissioning Paul Collier and John Page as authors. It is worth a read (or at least the summary is...)

The report explores some ways in which developing countries can accelerate processes of industrial development and thus 'break in' to the middle-income bracket. Four main suggestions are offered:

Clustering, SEZs, regional integration & integration of extractive industries with industrial sectors.

The idea of creating export zones is a proven way of stimulating collective growth (i.e. China); meanwhile regional integration is a must if African countries are ever to sustain incremental benefits from industrialisation policies. The policies make sense, and would constitute a progressive package adopted together.

There are also questions. Industrial exports would need to be diverse (or at least part of a sophisticated regional strategy) to protect against global price shocks. They would also need to be extremely efficient to compete against Chinese manufacturers. They would also need to engage with a lot of people - and this could necessitate aggressive urbanisation policies.

The issue is not whether this would be a good thing, but how it would affect existing policies. How would a rapid manufacturing drive impact upon long-term national development plans, which have made so much play over engaging with diverse stakeholders? Im not sure that sacrificing everything to push for more export-based policy is in everyone's interests...

H

From a new piece by Mahmood Mamdani from the London Review of Books. This is probably the best analysis of Zimbabwe's political situation I have read:

"The arguments, which are not new, turn on questions of nationalism and democracy, pitting champions of national sovereignty and state nationalism against advocates of civil society and internationalism. One group accuses the other of authoritarianism and self-righteous intolerance; it replies that its critics are wallowing in donor largesse. Nationalists speak of a historical racism that has merely migrated from government to civil society with the end of colonial rule, while civil society activists speak of an ‘exhausted’ nationalism, determined to feed on old injustices. This fierce disagreement is symptomatic of the deep divide between urban and rural Zimbabwe."

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n23/mamd01_.html

Thinking Laterally about Corruption?

A new briefing from the Economist Intelligence Unit tells us that "although Africa's economies are growing, they appear to be getting more corrupt, too." A couple of statements within the report caught my interest.

1. "high levels of corruption are not necessarily bad for economic growth"

2. "it is no longer possible to argue that corruption deters foreign direct investment"

These statements cut to the quick of western perceptions of Africa. First, the assumption that African states have not succeeded economically because of some inherent predisposition to corruption - which rather simplifies a litany of structural and historical issues.

Secondly, it begins to peel back the notion that corruption in Africa is a one-sided affair; something that is endemic within governments, and something that foreign investors must grin and bear. In fact, opaque financial deals have long benefited both sides of the equation; something that Chinese investment on the continent has now brought into sharp focus.

H

The Politics of Language in Rwanda (3)

Another take on the Rwanda/France dispute, from Marcel Berlins at the Guardian:

"Rwanda is a small and not especially influential country, but it has made a decision which, I fear, may have consequences disproportionate to its size and importance. It has officially ditched French and adopted English as its language of international communication, and as the language taught in its schools. True, Rwanda had reasons other than linguistic to snub French. It still blames France for, in effect, not preventing the Hutus from massacring 800,000 Tutsis. But that resentment has taken second place as a motive for dumping the language. The main reason is business, as was made clear by Rwanda's trade and industry minister, in dismissive terms: "French is spoken only in France, some parts of West Africa, parts of Canada and Switzerland." By contrast, "English has emerged as a backbone for growth and development not only in the region but around the globe."

Last year, Rwanda became a member of the East African Community, joining Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi, only the last of which remains Francophone. But how long before it too succumbs to the lure of English? Next year, Rwanda is expected to be admitted to the Commonwealth. Algeria and Madagascar have made overtures to join. They haven't done so because they love English culture or want to play cricket. Theirs is a calculated business decision to enter a club which will offer them the best opportunities, and if that club speaks English, they'll learn the language."

Structural Adjustment for the West?

Larry Elliott on the greatest irony of the current financial crisis:

"Strange things have happened during this crisis, not the least of which is that the IMF was last week praising in developed countries all the things it normally excoriates in developing nations. Structural adjustment plans for the poor have involved privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation. Structural adjustment plans for the west, it seems, comprise of nationalisation, subsidisation and re-regulation. The one-size-fits-all model of development is just one of the many sacred cows to have been slain over the past 14 months."

Democracy & Accountability in Africa: Some Thoughts

This is a short response to Graham Harrison’s recent piece on this blog, but also the result of some recent conversations with colleagues over issues of democracy, accountability and political representation in Africa.

If democracy is the answer, what exactly is the question? Harrison’s suggestion is that democratic ends – in the most holistic sense of the word – need not necessarily be achieved through liberal democratic means. Similarly, growth and improved social conditions can be stimulated in non-democratic systems. He cites Uganda (Museveni’s ‘no-party democracy’), Tanzania and Botswana as examples of cases in which African states have exhibited positive growth trends with no change in the ruling party for thirty years.

There are two debates at work here. The first, a question of definition: does a multi-party election represent democracy in itself? Or is it just a part of the whole, of a democratic culture that values economic and social equality, political plurality and a vibrant civil society? The second question is one of development. If we accept that ‘development’ is understood as a combination of improved living conditions and national economic growth, then the question becomes: do we need democratic conditions to achieve this?

The two questions are, of course, deeply intertwined – and even more so because the dominant discourse of development within global multilateral institutions maintains that democracy and (liberal, pro-market) economic growth are complementary, and should be mutually reinforcing. And without question, one can find examples to counter this assertion – not least in the transition of China from underdeveloped nation to emerging world power. A commonly heard argument runs: ‘why should African countries be forced to practice liberal democracy and liberal economics, when East Asia has so clearly shown the alternative?’

Another argument I have heard is that we should look to more traditional models of political representation – one that sees democratic consultation practiced more directly. If you like, the idea of discussing ideas until a consensus is reached, a la Nyerere’s vision of African democracy. But is this more likely to work than representative, liberal democracy? We might argue that elections can be rigged and elites can pervert the political process – but is this not just as likely under a ‘no-party’ system? Even if formal methods of public consultation were put in place, would we have a guarantee that elites would listen?

To me, the fundamental issue is one of accountability. In a sense, it doesn’t matter what kind of ‘democracy’ one advocates, the real crux is in who guides the democratic process. Too often African governments are hamstrung by their economic and political dependence on the international community – meaning that they are effectively more accountable to their benefactors than to their citizens.

Think about infrastructures. All the attention paid to anti-corruption and transparency efforts is about making sure financial flows are well streamlined – aid flows in, resources and profits out. If as much attention was paid to strengthening democratic institutions, the result might be a higher turnover of political leadership. A strong electoral commission can have a dramatic effect – as differing outcomes in the recent Sierra Leonean and Kenyan elections showed.

The problem is, it is in nobodies interests but that of African populations to make these kind of reforms happen – and there is a lack of resources and political coordination to turn this need into a force that can effectively lobby for change. If this can be addressed, then perhaps real accountability can be restored between African citizens and their governments. Until then, we can talk about political systems as much as we want; but without changing a great deal.

New article on Zimbabwe

Apologies for the lack of activity recently - see the link for an article in World Politics Review: 

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=2695

H